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Bearss: Civil War Operations In and Around Pensacola Part III

CIVIL WAR OPERATIONS IN AND AROUND
PENSACOLA PART III *
by E DWIN C. B EARSS
Pensacola Is Lost

F

IVE DAYS SUBSEQUENT to the great artillery duel of November 22-23 Bragg endeavored to transmit mail to the Confederate prisoners held by the Yankees. Brown refused to receive the
letters and even disdained to state his reasons for so doing. He was
by no means as courteous and amiable as he had been after the
attack on his outside confrere, Colonel Wilson. Later in the day
a small yawl attempted to enter the bay from the fleet, a privilege heretofore accorded to the Federals, as until November 22
the Rebels’ vessels had been allowed to tie up at the navy yard
without interference. Fire was opened, and the crew hurriedly
abandoned the vessel and swam for shore. 1
On December 3 Federal troops, under Brigadier General John
W. Phelps, 2 occupied Ship Island, Mississippi. This island, lying
twelve miles off the Mississippi coast, would provide an ideal
base for units of the Federal fleet charged with the mission of
blockading the mouths of the Mississippi River. In addition, a
serious threat to Mobile was implied with the Northerners in
possession of the islands flanking the Mississippi Sound. Secretary
of War Benjamin inquired of Bragg “whether General Withers
had taken any measures to defend Mobile against a coup de main
via Pascagoula?” 3 Bragg replied to this inquiry on December 11:

The danger to Mobile which you suggest is provided
for. Mounted men are stationed at the points where the en*

Part I of this study appeared in the October, 1957, number of the
Quarterly and Part II in the January, 1961, number.
1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion
(Washington: 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. VI, 771-72 (cited hereafter
as Official Records).
2. John W. Phelps was born in Vermont and graduated from the Military Academy in the class of 1836. Upon graduation he was commissioned a brevet 2d lieutenant in the artillery. Phelps rose gradually in rank and on May 17, 1861, was commissioned brigadier
general of volunteers.
3. Ibid., 774.
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emy might land, with instructions to report any hostile demonstration, and all our infantry out of the forts and light
artillery are in readiness for concentration on any point, and
the telegraph could secure re-enforcements from here [Pensacola] in ten hours. 4
In spite of the threat constituted by the Yankee occupation
of Ship Island, the Confederate garrison at Pensacola was weakened during the initial week of December by the dispatch of the
7th Alabama, commanded by Colonel Wood, to East Tennessee. 5
All the while, Bragg continued to be plagued by his old bugaboo
- shortage of arms. At this time nearly 3,000 men in the Department of Alabama and West Florida were sans weapons. 6
Besides the chronic arms shortage another problem now arose
to confront the Confederates. The term of enlistment for many
of the twelve months’ men had nearly expired. Just as marked
progress was being made in the re-enlistment of these men, the
Confederate Congress, on December 11, passed the “Bounty and
Furlough Law.” This Act provided a bounty of fifty dollars and
a furlough of sixty days with transportation to and from his home
to any soldier who would enlist for two or three years or for the
duration of the war. By way of further inducement it also promised that all troops re-enlisting should, when their original terms
of enlistment expired, have the right to reorganize themselves
into companies, battalions, and regiments and elect their officers.
The latter feature Major General Emory Upton characterized as,
“An act to disorganize and dissolve the Provisional Army.” The
bounty inducement was made to include all State troops that might
enlist for more than two years in the Confederate service and to
all volunteers recruited for three years or the duration of the
war. 7
Bragg found that men who had been satisfied with their
competent field officers were “now tom and tossed about by the
intrigues of designing men, seeking their own advancement or
revenge upon others who have made them do their duty.” 8 Discord now reigned where harmony had prevailed, and many of
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ibid., 779.
Ibid., 777.
Ibid.
Albert B. Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (New
York: 1924), 6-7.
8. Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. VI, 784.
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the most capable officers Bragg felt sure would “be sacrificed to
this fell spirit.” 9 The commander of the Department of Alabama
and West Florida believed that if the “Bounty and Furlough Law”
had not been passed he would have been able to secure the reenlistment of 5,000 of the 6,000 twelve month’s men stationed
in and around Pensacola. Confronted with the confusion engendered by the law he felt that if 2,000 renewed their services
it would be remarkable. 10
The Confederate Government’s satisfaction with Bragg’s conduct of affairs in the West Florida-Alabama region was expressed
in a letter from Secretary of War Benjamin on December 27.
In this epistle the North Carolinian was offered the command
of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Benjamin’s letter stated
further:
You have so thoroughly and satisfactorily prepared the
defenses at the latter point [Pensacola] that we scarcely
believe another attempt will be made on your defenses, and
hope that by sending Kirby Smith to take your place, if you
should leave, that important point will be successfully
defended. 11
The news of a federal raid upon Biloxi, Mississippi, on the
last day of the year caused Benjamin to rescind this offer to
Bragg. 12
After the Federal bombardment of November 22-23, Bragg
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 788-89. Edmund Kirby Smith was born at St. Augustine,
Florida, on May 16, 1824. He was appointed to West Point and
graduated in 1845, standing 25th in his class. During the Mexican
War he received two brevets for gallantry and meritorious conduct.
On March 3, 1861, he resigned from the United States Army, and
was commissioned a colonel of cavalry in the Confederate States
Army. In June he was promoted to brigadier general and was severely wounded during the Battle of First Manassas on July 21,
1861.
12. Ibid., 794. Flag Officer McKean had been informed that a Rebel
steamer was at anchor near Biloxi on December 31. In consequence
of this intelligence he dispatched Commander Melancton Smith,
with the steamers Water Witch, New London, and Henry Lewis, to
endeavor to capture her, but upon reaching Biloxi Smith discovered
that the steamer had been removed. The commander demanded the
surrender of the town, the command was complied with, and a detachment of seamen and marines was landed, a small sand battery
destroyed, and two guns, a 9-pounder and an 6-pounder, brought
off.

Published by STARS, 1960

3

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 39 [1960], No. 4, Art. 3
C IVIL W AR O PERATIONS

IN AND

A ROUND P ENSACOLA 333

ordered the construction of new batteries on Oak Island, Deer
Point, and at the mouth of the Big Lagoon. By the end of the year
these emplacements had been completed and armed with 10-inch
columbaids. These additional fortifications greatly strengthened
the Confederates’ position in the Pensacola Bay Area. 13
During this period the bluecoats on Santa Rosa Island were
reinforced by the 75th New York Volunteers, Colonel John A.
14
Colonel Brown called Adjutant General
Dodge commanding.
Lorenzo Thomas’ attention to the fact that:
The Sixth [New York] Regiment, I am sorry to say, so
far as the officers are concerned, is in a state of disorganization; criminations, recriminations, charges, and countercharges, between the officers, and especially between the
colonel and two or three espousing his side and the other
officers of the regiment, became of such daily occurrence,
that I had peremptorily to stop it, and to notify all concerned that I would entertain no more complaints. . . . 15
In closing his letter to the War Department, Brown requested
to be relieved from his post citing “that I cannot endure another
summer in this enervating climate, and that my health and probably my life will be sacrificed by it. I have now spent upwards
of fifteen years in Florida, and I require the bracing influences of
a Northern climate.” 16
The next clash in Pensacola Bay was precipitated by the Confederates. On January 1, about 3 A.M., a small private steamer
was imprudently run into the wharf at the navy yard within range
of the Federal guns. This was the first instance of a boat of any
kind putting in at the navy yard since the bombardment of November 22-23. Hence Brown viewed it as sheer bravado or an
13. Ibid., 674.
1 4 . I b i d . , 6 7 3 , 7 8 2 . B r o w n ’s r e t u r n f o r h i s c o m m a n d f o r t h e m o n t h
of December was as follows:
Present for Duty Aggregate
Stations
Troops
Officers Men
Present
Santa Rosa Island:
Fort Pickens
Detachments 1st and 2d
C a m p Lincoln
Artillery and 3d Infantry
19
568
704
13
6th New York Infantry
228
474
Camp Seward
75th New York Infantry
32
711
829
15.
16.

Ibid., 673-74.
Ibid., 674.

Total
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attempt by the Rebels to draw his fire. The Federal commander
ordered his heavy guns to open fire upon the steamer. After three
shots had landed nearby, the vessel pulled hurriedly away from
the dock. One of the Southern siege guns briefly returned the
Yankees’ fire - then all was quiet. 17
On the mainland General Anderson was in command of the
Confederate forces in the absence of General Bragg, who was inspecting the defenses of Mobile Bay. 18 Anderson, while under the
influence of intoxicating beverages, forgot about the demonstrated
superiority of the Federal heavy ordnance, and directed the Rebel
batteries to be prepared to open fire. 19 Three-quarters of an hour
after the initial firing had ceased, the Confederate heavy ordnance roared into action.
The Yankees vigorously returned this fire, using only their
heaviest guns. Their rate of fire was much slower than in the
previous month’s bombardment, but more accurate. Convinced by
their former experience of the difficulty of destroying or burning
the forts or the buildings in the navy yard, at the extreme range,
with explosive projectiles, the Federals this time used rock-fire
and carcasses. By 9 P.M. a large fire was kindled in the navy
yard. Within an hour the whole firmanent was illuminated as a
large and valuable warehouse, with considerable public property,
was consumed in the conflagration. From this hour on, except
for a harrassing fire maintained by the Union mortars, the big
guns stood mute. By 2. A.M. the Federal mortars, too, ceased
firing and at 4 A.M., with the return of an irate General Bragg,
the Confederate cannoneers in turn ceased their labors. 20
In assaying the results of the second bombardment one is
convinced that in this exchange, like that of November 22-23,
the Confederates came off decidedly second best. Undoubtedly
the chief factor contributing to this continued inferiority was the
fact that the majority of the Federal artillerists were regulars
who had served a long apprenticeship. A secondary reason was
the continued shortage of powder and shot that served to embarrass the Confederates and greatly limit the amount of target practice their gunners could have. Colonel Brown noted that the
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

495-96.
497.
498.
495-98.
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Rebels’ fire on January 1 was not as accurate as in the exchange
of the previous month and that very few shot or shell struck the
walls or entered Fort Pickens. 21 The Federals reported their
losses as two men slightly injured. 22 While the Confederates did
not suffer any men killed or wounded, considerable material
damage was caused by the fire in the navy yard. 23 Probably of
greater importance, the Confederates had expended a large supply of ammunition that was almost impossible to replace. A final
upshot of the affair was General Dick Anderson’s relief from
duty. Bragg informed Adjutant General Cooper: “I . . . urge on
the Department my request for a second in command here who
could be intrusted with this army in my necessary absence.” 24
In the course of his tour of inspection of the defenses of Mobile Bragg noted that the infantry brigade, commanded by the
former Confederate Secretary of War, Brigadier General L. P.
Walker, was in deplorable condition. The commander had established his headquarters in Mobile with a large and useless staff
maintained at a great expense, while his troops suffered in crowded tents and huts. Walker had even neglected to provide any
hospital facilities for those of his command struck down by illness. Bragg found no evidence of organization or training schedule. A state of anarchy seemed to prevail with each regimental
commander exercising authority independent of the others.
The necessary consequences of such a state of affairs were
disease, demoralization, and a high mortality rate. Each day approximately one-third of Walker’s command reported for sick
call. 25
Walker was ordered to report to his command but, protesting
sundry pretexts, he was still absent from his brigade on January
1. Bragg, expressing the disdain of the West Pointer for the political general, informed the Secretary of War: “Except as a matter of principle, I attach no importance to the absence of the
general [Walker], as his want of knowledge and experience, and
it appears to me an inaptitude for military command, render it
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid., 496.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 497-98.
Ibid., 498.
Ibid., 793. Walker had resigned as Secretary of War on September
16, 1861, and accepted a commission as brigadier general.
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impossible for him to supply the wants in that brigade. I consequently look for little improvement without a change.” 26
Despite Bragg’s foreboding the results of the “Bounty and
Furlough Law” were not as dire as he had predicted. Its evil consequences had been mediated by the cooperation of J. Gil Shorter, the recently elected governor of Alabama, and the people on
the home front who, as a general rule, had prompted their relatives and neighbors to remain in the armed services. Many of the
troops who had gone on leave were back with their units before
the expiration of their furloughs. Bragg, to encourage the reenlistment of the twelve months’ men, visited the cantonments
of the sundry units in his department and personally exhorted
them. 27 In spite of the apparent success of the re-enlistment
campaign Bragg, who continued to fret, and with good cause, over
what effect the re-organization would have on the units and
whether or not the men would choose competent field officers,
admonished Benjamin: “The great question now is to keep up
their organization [the units], for one of our well organized and
instructed regiments, under good officers, is worth any two
which could be made up of a heterogenous mass fresh from the
country, and they require but half the number of arms.” 28
With the arrival of an artillerist in the person of General
Samuel Jones, Dick Anderson’s replacement from Virginia, Bragg
re-organized his Department. He divided the 16,068 troops under his command into two armies: The Army of Mobile and the
Army of Pensacola. General Withers retained command of the
former forces and General Jones assumed charge of the latter.
General Walker, an encumbrance of whose conduct Bragg had
repeatedly complained, was transferred to Montgomery to command the Camp of Instruction. Bragg noted, “I have no idea he
will be of any service; but he can do less harm there.” Gladden
was ordered to Mobile to take over Walker’s dispirited brigade,
and Brigadier General J. K. Jackson replaced Gladden at Pensacola. 29 It was with regret that Bragg relinquished the immediate
command of the Army of Pensacola; however, he would now be
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid.
Ibid.. 806.
Ibid.
Ibid., 815, 816, 820. Samuel Jones was born in Virginia in 1820
and graduated from West Point in 1841. He served on the Maine
frontier during the boundary dispute prior to the Webster-Ashbur-
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able to devote more time to preparing the units of his command
for combat.
News of the Confederate disasters at Mill Springs, Kentucky,
ton Treaty; in Florida, 1845-46; and from 1846 to 1851 was on
duty at the Military Academy as assistant professor of mathematics
and instructor of infantry and of artillery. Jones resigned from
the U. S. Army on April 28, 1861, and was commissioned major
in the Confederate artillery. At the 1st Battle of Manassas Jones
served as Beauregard’s chief of artillery and ordnance. He was advanced to colonel for this service a nd he was promoted brigadier
general to date from July 21, the day of victory.
Abstract from field returns of the Department of Alabama and West
Florida, February 1, 1862:
Present For Duty Aggregate Aggregate Present
Officers Men
Troops
and Absent
Present
Army of Pensacola,
Brig. Gen. Sam Jones,
Commanding
377
5,254
6,790
8,150
Army of Mobile, Brig.
Gen. J. M. Withers,
9,278
Commanding
440
6,777
10,056
Grand total
817
12,031
16,068
18,206
The organization of the troops in Bragg’s department was as follows:
Army of Pensacola:
1st Alabama Infantry Regiment
17th Alabama Infantry Regiment
1st Florida Infantry Regiment
5th Georgia Infantry Regiment
36th Georgia Infantry Regiment
1st Louisiana Infantry Regiment
5th Mississippi Infantry Regiment
8th Mississippi Infantry Regiment
9th Mississippi Infantry Regiment
10th Mississippi Infantry Regiment
27th Mississippi Infantry Regiment
2 companies Independent Alabama Mounted
Independent Florida Mounted Company
Company Alabama State Artillery
Robertson’s Alabama Light Artillery Company
Detachment C. S. Marines
Army of Mobile:
2d Alabama Infantry Regiment
18th Alabama Infantry Regiment
19th Alabama Infantry Regiment
20th Alabama Infantry Regiment
21st Alabama Infantry Regiment
22d Alabama Infantry Regiment
23d Alabama Infantry Regiment
24th Alabama Infantry Regiment
25th Alabama Infantry Regiment
2d Alabama Infantry Battalion
Alabama Infantry Company
1st Mississippi Infantry Battalion
6 companies Alabama Mounted Volunteers
1st Battalion Alabama Artillery
2d Battalion Alabama Light Artillery
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on January 19 and Fort Henry, Tennessee, on February 6 had
serious repercussions in all parts of the Confederacy. On February 8 Bragg received a letter from Benjamin which read in part:
The President desires that you will as soon as possible
send to Knoxville all the troops you can spare from your command without immediate danger, and he hopes that the number will be at least four regiments. The condition of affairs
in Kentucky and Tennessee demands from us the most vigorous effort for defense, and General A. S. Johnston is so heavily outnumbered, that it is scarcely possible for him to maintain his whole line without large additional re-enforcements. 30
Bragg divined Flag-officer Foote’s intent to push his gunboats
up the Tennessee River and sever the railroad line linking Memphis and Chattanooga, and rushed a regiment northward to Decatur, Alabama, to guard the vital Memphis and Charleston
Railroad bridge across the Tennessee River. In accordance with
the President’s instructions the 5th Georgia, 9th Mississippi,
20th and 23rd Alabama Regiments entrained for Knoxville. 31
Bragg correctly foresaw that the dispersed condition of the Confederate defenses was an invitation to disaster. Orders were immediately drafted charging General Jones with the task of withdrawing his forces, save for an outpost, from Deer Point. The
gunboat Bradford was ordered to stand by that position every
evening to bring off the picket in case of attack. 32
Confederates’ hopes in Bragg’s department were chilled further on February 16 when rumors of the fall of Fort Donelson
were received. The fall of the bastion guarding the Cumberland
River was confirmed in a telegram from Benjamin to Bragg two
days later. Bragg was informed, “the President desires that you
proceed as promptly as possible to withdraw your forces from
Pensacola and Mobile and hasten to the defense of the Tennessee line. In doing this, of course the first care will be to save, as
far as possible, all our artillery and munitions of war.” 33
It was proposed by the Confederate War Department to
withdraw all Southern forces from Pensacola - as a weak garri30.
31.
32.
33.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

823.
894.
824-25.
828.
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son would inevitably invite capture - but it was deemed advisable to leave an effective garrison in the forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay. The continued occupation of the forts
guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay, it was believed, would defer for an extended period a movement against Mobile. 34
Bragg was ordered to entrain all the Confederate forces in
Mobile as well as those in Pensacola and dispatch them northward on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to the Tennessee border.
At Corinth, where the Mobile and Ohio Railroad intersected
the Memphis and Charleston Railway, the Rebels were to detrain
and await further orders. Heavy rains had washed out a number
of bridges on the Mobile and Ohio, and troop movements were
temporarily forestalled; however, by February 27 repairs had been
effected and the transfer of the 1st Louisiana, and 18th and 22d
Alabama Regiments to the endangered area commenced. 35
General Jones, at Pensacola, received the following directive
from Bragg:
You will make all dispositions at the earliest moment,
working day and night, to abandon Pensacola. Send to this
place [Mobile] all the heavy shell guns, rifle guns, and carriages, etc., complete, with the ammunition for them; all
other supplies to Montgomery. . . .
This movement should be made with all the secrecy possible; removing your guns at night, and masking the positions, taking the most advanced first. Keep sufficient troops
in position to deceive the enemy until all is ready.
I desire you particularly to leave nothing the enemy can
use; burn all from Fort McRee to the junction with the Mobile road. Save the guns, and if necessary destroy your gunboats and all other boats. They might be used against us.
Destroy all machinery, etc., public and private, which could
be useful to the enemy; especially disable the sawmills in
and around the bay and burn the lumber. Break up the railroad from Pensacola to the Junction, carrying the iron up
to a safe point. 36
On February 28 General Bragg, at the urgent request of
General P. G. T. Beauregard, decided to proceed immediately to
Corinth. 37 As General Withers had previously been relieved of
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 834-35.
36. Ibid., 835.
37. Ibid., 834. In February 1862 Beauregard had been ordered to the
Mississippi Valley as second in command to Albert S. Johnston.
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command at Mobile, on February 4, and sent to Fort Pillow,
Tennessee, Bragg decided that the senior officer in the department, General Jones, should assume command in his stead. 38
In the year that Bragg had commanded the Confederate
troops in and around Pensacola he had performed a creditable
job. He had shown himself to be an excellent organizer and
disciplinarian. On assuming command he had brought order out
of chaos. Undoubtedly his men were the best drilled of any Confederate force in the spring of 1862. The historian in weighing
the course of future events wonders what the results would have
been if Bragg’s talents had been applied to the training and organization of the Confederate armies instead of his being assigned to a field command. One of Bragg’s characteristics that
was to bode ill for the future had already asserted itself. This
was the North Carolinian’s inability to get along with his subordinates. While Walker was undoubtedly incompetent, Dick
Anderson, when handled correctly, was to prove himself to be
one of Robert E. Lee’s more valuable aides.
Six days prior to the assumption of departmental command
by General Jones, Colonel Brown in accord with his previous
request was relieved of command of the Department of Florida
by Brigadier General Lewis G. Arnold. 39 Intelligence of the consternation among the Rebels on the mainland was related to the
new Federal commander by two whites and two Negroes who
crossed over to Santa Rosa Island from Milton by way of East
Bay. However, the removal of troops and heavy ordnance from
the Southern strongholds was ably camouflaged by General Jones
so that the Federals discounted these individuals’ story of a Confederate evacuation of the Pensacola area. Arnold complained to
the War Department:
As my position is a defensive one, on an island, I am
perfectly helpless for any offensive movement requiring water
transportation for 50 men without naval cooperation. I have
not under my command a dispatch steamer or sail vessel, and
have scarcely enough surf-boats to land stores for the command. 40
38. Ibid., 836.
39. Ibid., 436. Lewis G. Arnold had been promoted to brigadier general
of volunteers on January 24, 1862.
40. Ibid.. 705.
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The sailing sloop-of-war Vincennes, of the Head of Passes
debacle, was the only ship-of-war lying off Santa Rosa Island,
but was worse than useless for operations within the bay.
In the second week of January, Secretary Welles had made
a change in naval organization when he divided the Gulf Blockading Squadrons into two commands, the Eastern and Western
Gulf Blockading Squadrons. The important Western Gulf Blockading squadron, with its task of opening the Mississippi from its
mouth, was entrusted to Captain David G. Farragut, a native of
East Tennessee, while McKean would assume responsibility for
the Eastern Gulf Blockading Squadron. February 2 found the
new commander aboard his flag-ship Hartford voyaging forth
from Hampton Roads, Virginia. After eighteen days at sea the
Hartford arrived off Ship Island. Here Farragut met Flag-Officer
McKean, the necessary transfers were made, and the next day
the Tennessean formally assumed command of his new station. 41
Arnold, desiring to take advantage of the discomfiture of the
Confederates, took up his pen and composed a letter to the new
Federal naval commander on March 15. In his epistle he called
attention to his inability to conduct offensive operations without
naval cooperation. Arnold proposed that with the aid of several
gunboats a landing could be effected at Town Point. Arnold
correctly viewed Town Point as the key to Pensacola Bay. Elaborating this point he wrote:
The rebels have, and will have, entire control of the bay
an d inner harbor as long as they hold this point [Town
Point] and their line of forts and batteries; but if we can
take this point, your gunboats can pass out of range of their
heaviest guns - from Four Mile Point, on Santa Rosa Island,
to Milton, on the main-land, which would enable you to
capture or destroy all the rebel steamers and sail vessels in
those waters, and more perfectly blockade the harbor of
Pensacola. 42
Farragut, due to his preoccupation with the pending assault
on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, answered in the negative Arnold’s request for the aid of several gunboats. 43
41. Alfred T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: 1883),
52.
42. Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. VI, 711.
43. Ibid., 712.
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The evacuation of Pensacola continued to be hampered by
the damage caused to the railroads by the recent floods. It was
March 4 before the first train passed over the Mobile and Pensacola Railroad, and the tracks of the Alabama and Florida Railroad were in such bad shape that trains were not permitted to
run after dark. The president and superintendent of the Alabama
and Florida came to Pensacola for a conference with General
Jones in an attempt to resolve the problem. To expedite matters
it was determined to post the superintendent at Pollard, Alabama, to supervise the movements on all roads meeting at that
strategic junction. It was provided that two special trains would
proceed daily from Pensacola to Pollard and there such supplies
as could not be removed to Mobile or Montgomery would be
stored. 44
With the transportation problem somewhat mitigated the 1st
Alabama entrained on the night of March 5 for Memphis. At
this time General Jones requested and received permission to retrain the 27th Mississippi Regiment at Pensacola a few days
beyond the time fixed. by Bragg for the evacuation of the port.
The reasons cited by Jones for this request were:
I am convinced that the enemy on Santa Rosa Island is
not prepared to attack this place at present. I have never beleived the force as large as reported. . . .
I believe if we keep up even the appearance of being
prepared to defend the place the enemy will not attack it.
The governor of Alabama informs me that by the end of this
week he can send me 1,000 men engaged to serve for thirty
days, and by the middle of next week more. . . . Under these
circumstances I believe that Colonel Jones [the commander
of the 27th Mississippi], with his regiment and the men who
can be collected here before I can possibly send off all the
troops you have called for, can keep up such an appearance
of preparation to defend the place as to deter the enemy
from attacking. 45
To help relieve the strain upon the overworked railroads
General Jones ordered that the steamer Time should be loaded
with naval stores. In this way when it should become necessary
to evacuate Pensacola, Time’s captain could take his vessel up the
44. Ibid., 838.
45. Ibid., 840.
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Escambia River as far as possible. From there the naval stores
could be moved to the nearby Alabama and Florida Railroad
for transportation elsewhere. In addition the navy had under
construction two gunboats near Milton, which were nearly ready
for service. If they could not be taken up the Escambia, measures would have to be taken to provide for their destruction. 46
As a partial implementation of Bragg’s scorched earth policy
Lieutenant-Colonel W. K. Beard with two companies of the 1st
Florida Regiment embarked on the steamer Tom Murray at Deer
Point at 8 P.M. on the evening of March 10, arriving at Miller’s
Mills, in East Bay, at 11 P.M. Not wishing to injure persons
unaware of the object of the mission the firing of the sawmills
and other property was deferred until morning.
Completing their demolitions at Miller’s Mills the Confederates again boarded the Tom Murray and proceeded up the Blackwater River. Occasionally the troops landed to set fire to the sawmills and stacks of lumber piled near the river’s course. The mission of destruction was continued until the head of navigation
was reached at the plantation owned by Jackson Morton. From
there the task force returned to Milton and burned the two gunboats, as it was found to be impracticable to tow them up the
Escambia River, the boats being unable to cross the bar at its
mouth. From Milton the expedition proceeded up the Escambia,
burning the public property encountered enroute. 47 A large
quantity of ship timber which could not be burned was cut
adrift. By 10 A.M. on March 15, the men of the 1st Florida
had reached Bluff Springs, near the Alabama line, and Colonel
Beard was able to report-mission accomplished. 48
Two days prior to the arrival of Colonel Beard’s men at Bluff
Springs, General Jones had transferred his headquarters to Mobile. Colonel Thomas H. Jones, of the 27th Mississippi, assumed
charge of the Confederate forces involved in carrying out the
evacuation of Pensacola. 49 The passive attitude displayed by the
Federal troops stationed on Santa Rosa Island caused the Con46. Ibid., 848.
47. Ibid., 893. Of the two gunboats destroyed the one being built by
F. G. Howard was yet on its stocks, and the one being built by
Ollinger and Bruce had been in the water about ten days.
48. Ibid., 859-60.
49. Ibid., 856.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol39/iss4/3

14

Bearss: Civil War Operations In and Around Pensacola Part III
344

F L O R I D A H I S T O R I C A L Q UARTERLY

federates’ hopes of eventually retaining possession of Pensacola to
soar. General Jones informed Bragg:
Colonel Jones wrote me on the 16th instant that all was
going on well; that the new troops, though unarmed, were
full of energy and zeal, and he adds, “With the army I now
have, had I arms, I could defy the attempt of the enemy to
dislodge me.” . . . Since he wrote, the governor of Alabama
has sent him 300 arms, and I have strong hope of being able
to send him a sufficient number to arm nearly all the new
troops. I am more and more convinced that the enemy’s
force in the Gulf, and especially on Santa Rosa, has been
greatly overestimated. When I left Pensacola only 96 tents
could be seen on the island. The season for operations on a
large scale on the Gulf is fast passing away, and if we can
hold our ground a month or two longer all may yet be well
on the Gulf Coast. 50
Jones’ initiative in endeavoring to hold Pensacola earned for
him Bragg’s approbation. In a letter dated March 28 Bragg in
succinct terms divined the course of events in the Mississippi
Valley:
Our defenses on the Mississippi are very imperfect, and
require all the guns we can command. Will you please hurry
forward those behind. There were in all at least twenty
heavy shell guns, besides 8-inch howitzers and rifle guns.
Half were ordered via Memphis and the other half to New
Orleans. But seven have yet reached Memphis. Please urge
them forward. . . .
. . . you will change the destination of those to New
Orleans, . . . and send them to Jackson, Miss., to be used
on the river near Vicksburg.
It is perfectly useless to send guns to New Orleans. If
we lose the river, New Orleans must fall; . . . no defense
can save it; . . . the railroads would be cut immediately, and
starvation would do its work. 51
In response to Bragg’s admonitions Colonel T. M. Jones immediately forwarded ten 10-inch and seven 8-inch columbiads,
nine sea-coast howitzers, four rifled guns, and two 8-inch siege
howitzers to Jackson, Mississippi. 52
50.
51.
52.

Ibid., 862.
Ibid., 867.
Ibid., 869.
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In the final week of March, General Arnold decided to send
Captain Henry W. Closson, 1st U. S. Artillery, with two companies of troops and a 10-pounder Parrott rifle, to make a reconnaissance in force eastward along Santa Rosa Island toward East
Pass. The Federal commander had learned that two hundred
armed Rebels, under Captain McPherson, were encamped on the
mainland opposite Santa Rosa Island some forty miles east of
Fort Pickens. 53 From their cantonment situated on the narrowest point on Santa Rosa Sound the Confederates were harrassing
the blockading schooners.
Closson’s combat patrol left Fort Pickens on March 27 and
after a difficult march of twelve miles bivouacked for the night. 54
Due to the difficult nature of the terrain it took two and one half
days to cover the additional twenty-four miles. At noon on March
31 Closson’s command bivouacked four miles from the Rebel
encampment. Upon setting up camp the Federal captain opened
communications with the blockading schooner Maria A. Wood.
Closson requested that three surfboats be made available for a
night attack upon the Southerners. 55
At dusk, leaving animals, disabled men, and surplus gear at
the camp, Closson moved forward, accompanied by a force of
one hundred and seventy men. After moving forward about two
miles a signal fire was kindled, and at 1 P.M. two of the surfboats approached the beach fronting on the Gulf and landed.
It was almost 1 A.M. before the third boat arrived. By this time
all chances of surprising the Rebel cantonment were precluded
for the Federals’ approach had been discovered by two Confedate pickets posted on the island. Closson ordered the surfboats
to return to the Maria A. Wood, and the men of Company K,
6th New York, to return to the Federal cantonment. The intrepid Federal commander then pressed forward with the remainder
of his task force, and crossed the island. On the north beach,
opposite the Rebel camp, and about 250 yards from it, the 10pounder Parrott rifle was emplaced. Quiet was then observed
until the huts in the Rebel encampment were revealed to the
anxious Federal gunners by the first streaks of dawn. Closson
53. Ibid., 500.
54. Closson’s patrol consisted of men from Company I, 1st Artillery,
and Companies K and D, 6th New York Volunteers.
55. The Maria A. Wood was a sailing schooner of 344 tons and its
armament consisted of two 32-pounders.
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gave the word to open fire, and several well directed shells burst
in the midst of the camp. Loud yells and violent curses were
clearly audible, and soon numerous Rebels could be discerned
fleeing through the underbrush in sundry states of undress. 56
After shelling the area thoroughly the Yankees returned to
their bivouac. With their supplies of rations and forage nearly
exhausted and the mules broken down by the strain of pulling
wagons through forty miles of heavy sand, it was readily apparent
to Closson that an early return to Fort Pickens was advisable.
To ease the return journey Closson transferred six sick men and
all the spare gear to the Maria A. Wood for transport to Fort
Pickens. The balance of the command then resumed the return
march to their base at Fort Pickens. Late in the afternoon while
trudging along the beach a scout reported a Confederate schooner
making its way up the sound. The rifled gun was unlimbered
and opened fire. Despite the extreme range several hits were
scored on the Rebel schooner but with undetermined results. 57
Twenty-four hours later the Federal combat patrol returned
to Fort Pickens. Closson’s reconnaissance in force, besides breaking up Captain McPherson’s cantonment, disclosed that the terrain of Santa Rosa Island was such as to preclude the large scale
movement of troops. Among the Confederates the sortie stimulated fears that the Yankees were contemplating some sort of
mischief.
In consequence four days later Governor Shorter of Alabama
took up his pen and composed an epistle to George W. Randolph,
who on March 24 has succeeded Benjamin as Davis’ Secretary of
War. In this letter Shorter argued:
Pensacola is, next to Norfolk, the most important point
on our entire seaboard to hold at this time . . . to the Yankee
Government its importance, in view of their manifest designs, is incalculable. They want a spacious and safe harbor
far South for their vast naval armament. Here they have it.
It is the only one in the Gulf to which their large ships can
find access. When they get it, there is the spacious bay to
ride in, the navy-yard to repair at, the fine hospital, and other
appointments, which cost the Old Government millions of
dollars. . . .
This great and important point can be securely held with
56. Ibid., 500-01.
57. Ibid., 501.
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5,000 men, properly armed and trained, against any force
the Yankee Government can detach for its capture. . . .
But we are now ill provided, and if provisions be not
made, and that soon, our comparatively naked condition will
be known to the invaders, and they will make a stroke at us
and take us I fear, almost without show of resistance.
Let me state to you plainly what is needed to put the
place in condition of defense:
1st. We want a good brigadier-general - some man who
will inspire confidence and effect speedy organization. The
gallant and worthy colonel [T. M. Jones] who now commands the post himself feels this want.
2nd. We want small-arms for nearly half the troops;
now have about 3,200, and we need permanently at the post
5,000 small arms.
3rd. We want now one or two artillery companies and
several companies of calvary. . . .
P.S. - If the Secretary will furnish arms, I will furnish
5,000 more troops for the post without delay, with the troops
already there included. 58
Seven days later Randolph replied to Shorter’s communication, assuring the Alabama chief executive that the Confederate
government: “fully appreciates the importance of Pensacola, and
has been making every possible effort to arm troops for its defense.” 59 However, due to the acute shortages of war material
then existing in the South the Confederate government was unable to furnish the arms and accoutrements requested by Shorter.
While telegraph wires hummed with messages regarding the
impending evacuation of Pensacola, grim news was received from
West Tennessee. At Shiloh on April 7 the Confederate legions
had been repulsed in what up to then was the bloodiest battle
in which American arms had participated. In this two-day holocaust many of the units until recently stationed in the Department of Alabama and West Florida played a valiant role. The
long months of rigorous training under General Bragg enabled
his corps to acquit itself honorably.
58. Ibid., 870-71. George W. Randolph was Thomas Jefferson’s grandson. At the time of the John Brown raid he organized a company
of artillery, which was subsequently maintained and operated against
the Federals at Big Bethel. Randolph was commissioned brigadier
general and given a command, which he held until appointed secretary of war on March 24, 1862.
59. Ibid., 873.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol39/iss4/3

18

Bearss: Civil War Operations In and Around Pensacola Part III
348

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL Q UARTERLY

Four days after the battle of Shiloh, General Sam Jones received a telegram from General Robert E. Lee ordering him to
turn over the command of the Department of Alabama and West
Florida to Brigadier General John Forney and report to General
Beauregard at Corinth. Forney arrived but, suffering from the
effects of the gunshot wound received at Dranesville, Virginia,
in the autumn of 1861, could not immediately take charge. Jones
informed General Lee of Forney’s condition, and was told he
could not leave Mobile until Forney was fit for active duty. 60
Meanwhile a Federal fleet under the command of Farragut
had entered the Mississippi and was attacking the twin Confederate bastions, Forts St. Philip and Jackson, some seventy miles
below the Crescent City. In consequence of this action Major
General Mansfield Lovell, the Confederate commander at New
Orleans, requested that additional pieces of heavy ordnance be
forwarded from Jones’ department for the defense of New Orleans. 61 In accord with Lovell’s request and to deceive the Yankees, the large columbiads were removed from their positions in
the dead of the night and fierce looking Quaker guns mounted
in their stead. 62 Two days later, on April 24, Lovell informed
Jones by telegraph: “The enemy has passed our forts. It is too
late to send any guns here; they had better go to Vicksburg.’’ 63
Colonel T. M. Jones, on receiving intelligence that Farragut’s
fleet had succeeded in passing the forts below New Orleans,
came to the conclusion that with his limited means of defense
reduced as it was by the withdrawal of nearly all his heavy guns
and ammunition, he could not hold the Federals at bay any
longer. He determined on his own initiative to begin the evacuation of the balance of the heavy guns and war materiel. 64 Three
days later Colonel Jones received written instructions from General Lee: “I would state that it is deemed expedient to remove
at once all Government property, including guns, munitions of
war, etc., not necessary for present service. . . .’’ 65 On receipt of
Lee’s instructions on the subject, round the clock fatigue details
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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were instituted to insure the removal of the heavy guns and
public property. All the powder and most of the large shot and
shell were removed; the small sized shot were buried. Most of
the valuable machinery, besides large quantities of copper, lead,
brass, and iron, even the gutters, lightning rods, window weights,
bells, pipes, and everything made of those valuable metals were
removed. 66
On the afternoon of May 7 the Confederates at Pensacola
were informed that Commander D. D. Porter, with a number of
mortar schooners and gunboats, was off Fort Morgan. 67 Some of
Porter’s junior officers suspected that the Confederates were evacuating their stronghold guarding the eastern approach to Mobile
Bay. To test this thesis the steamer Clifton ran in under the guns
of Fort Morgan. Ten shots were fired at the impudent Federal
vessel before Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. Baldwin could
extricate his ship from its embarrassing situation. Porter, convinced that the Rebels were not evacuating the forts, and deciding that the sea was becoming quite rough, ordered all his vessels
save the flagship Harriet Lane to return to Ship Island. 68
News of Porter’s activities at Fort Morgan served as a stimulus to the hard working Southerners at Pensacola. The next day
the 8th Mississippi Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel James T. Gates
commanding, was rushed to Mobile. Colonel Jones now issued
eleventh hour instructions concerning the impending evacuation
to his subordinates. During the night all the sick and the personal baggage were removed. To deceive the Yankees, sentries were
posted as usual on the beach. Under cover of darkness the Confederates marched out of their cantonments, taking the road to
Oakfield. One hour after the departure of the main column the
sentinels were withdrawn and followed in its wake. 69
Previously Colonel Jones had assigned five companies of
cavalrymen to carry out a scorched earth policy. The grim
troopers now moved to their assigned stations. At 11:30 P.M.
upon a pre-arranged signal two blue lights were displayed by
66. Ibid., 661.
67. Ibid., 660.
68. Richard S. West, The Second Admiral (New York: 1937), 147;
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War
of the Rebellion (Washington, 1894-1927), Ser. I, Vol. XVIII,
478-79 (cited hereafter as Official Records - Navies).
69. Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. VI, 660.
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Colonel John R. F. Tatnall and Colonel Jones from the cupola of
the Marine Hospital and promptly answered by similar signals
from the navy yard and Forts Barrancas and McRee. The
troopers then commenced their work of destruction. 70 Scarcely
had the signals been extinguished ere the public buildings, tents,
and everything of combustible material from the navy yard to
Fort McRee were enveloped in sheets of flames. Residents of
Pensacola, seven miles away, aided by the light from the conflagration could easily read a newspaper. Jones’ orders were to destroy everything that could be of use to the foe - explosive shells,
wood, and other combustibles were mixed into the large stacks of
coal stored in the navy yard before they were fired. This was to
discourage any attempts to extinguish the blaze on the part of
the Yankees. 71
Having received orders not to destroy any private property
the Confederates’ scorched earth policy in reference to Pensacola
was quite limited. Only a large turpentine factory containing a
large quantity of resin, the quartermaster’s storehouse, some small
boats, and three small steamers used as picket boats were fired.
In addition the torch was applied to two privately owned steamers,
the Mary and the Helen. The steamboat Turel, of light draught,
was loaded with valuable stores and machinery and proceeded
up the Escambia River to a point beyond the Federals’ reach. The
casemates and galleries of Fort McRee and the store rooms of
Fort Barrancas which had been previously filled with old lumber
and shell were ignited. 72
Having completed their work of destruction, the Confederates
in the early morning hours of May 10 withdrew from the area.
The demolition teams rejoined their comrades at Oakfield, six
miles north of Pensacola. Five companies of cavalry, under the
command of Captain F. J. Myers, covered the Confederate retreat up the Alabama and Florida Railroad toward Pollard,
Alabama. 73
Across the bay a few minutes before midnight General Arnold was aroused by the officer of the day who informed him
“that Fort McRee, the navy-yard, Marine Hospital and Barracks,
70.
71.
72.
73.
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and several other buildings, and two Rebel steamboats were on
fire.’’ 74 Since the fires had all broken out simultaneously Arnold
correctly assumed that the origin was arson. In the vain hope
of curbing the incendiarism ashore and putting the Rebels to
flight, the Federal gunners opened fire. Arnold summoned his
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Richard H. Jackson, who upon reporting was directed to board the schooner Maria A. Wood and proceed to Pensacola to demand the formal surrender of the city of
its civil authorities. By 5:30 A.M. the Maria A. Wood had arrived off the city and a boat bearing Lieutenant Jackson was
sent ashore under a flag of truce. Acting Mayor John Brosenham
delivered the city into Federal hands, and the Maria A. Wood
stood back to Fort Pickens. 75
Meanwhile fifty miles to the west at 2 A.M. on May 10 the
Harriet Lane’s lookout reported a brilliant light illuminating the
sky in the direction of Pensacola. Porter ordered the Harriet Lane
eastward at forced draught. The Harriet Lane steamed into Pensacola Bay on the course Porter had plotted the previous year for
the Powhatan. Without communicating with the fort, Porter proceeded up the bay to Pensacola. Enroute up the bay the Harriet
Lane encountered the Maria A. Wood returning to Santa Rosa
Island. A shot was fired across the Maria A. Wood’s stern. Porter
was informed by Acting Master Chase, of the schooner, that
Lieutenant Jackson had stolen the commander’s thunder and had
already received the city’s capitulation. Nevertheless the bombastic naval officer, completely ignoring the fact that Arnold did
not have any ships to transport men to the mainland, continued
up the bay to Pensacola. It was mid-afternoon before Porter returned to Fort Pickens and the aid of his comrades in arms. 76
The Harriet Lane was immediately turned into a ferry and
by 3 P.M. had landed 400 men, two pieces of artillery, horses,
and some baggage carts in the neighborhood of the navy yard.
Once upon the mainland Arnold’s troops wasted little time in
hoisting “Old Glory” over the navy yard, Forts Barrancas and
McRee, and Barrancas Barracks. 77
74. Ibid., 658.
75. Ibid., 658-59; Official Records-Navies, Ser. I, Vol. XVIII,
76. West, Second Admiral, 1 4 7 ; Official Records-Navies, Ser. I,
XVIII, 479. The Harriet Lane was a side-wheel steamer of 600
and was armed with three IX-inch Dahlgrens, one 30-pounder
rott Rifle, and one 12-pounder James Rifle.
77. Official Records, Ser. I, Vol VI, 658; West, Second Admiral,
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Two days later a portion of Arnold’s command (1,000
strong) took formal possession of Pensacola. The only opposition
encountered by the Federals during their march from Fort Barrancas occurred when some Rebel vedettes fired on the advanced
guard. Upon entering the city Arnold formed his troops in a
square around the flagstaff in the plaza and raised the national
ensign. As the colors shot to the top of the staff the only loyalists
to make a public demonstration were Negroes. If there were any
pro-Northern whites in the town they suppressed their emotions.
One could never tell when the Federal troops might be withdrawn and Secessionists knew how to be most unpleasant toward
acknowledged Unionists in their midst. 78
Survey parties from the Federal Army and Navy rapidly
totalled up the extent of damages caused by the Confederates’
scorched earth policy in the area. Colonel Jones’ demolition teams
had done an excellent job on the navy yard. Commander Porter
stated: “The yard is a ruin.” Despite these evil tidings Porter was
able to report a number of facilities that could possibly be salvaged. 79 General Arnold informed the Secretary of War: “Fort
Barrancas is very little injured by the fire and Barrancas Barracks
not at all. Fort McRee is seriously damaged, Marine Hospital destroyed, and several store-houses in the navy-yard . . . burned.” 80
After sixteen months the Federal government had repossessed
the public property in the Pensacola Bay area that had been
seized by the state of Florida on January 12, 1861. Initially
Fort Pickens was as isolated and susceptible to attack as Fort
Sumter, but in Florida affairs were handled more judiciously by
both parties. Outside of a few musket shots exchanged in the
second week of January a tense period of watchful waiting prevailed for nine months.
On September 14, five months after the surrender of Fort
Sumter, occurred the first clash of arms in the Pensacola area in
78. West, Second Admiral, 147-48.
79. Official Records-Navies, Ser. I, Vol. XVIII, 482. The stone wharves
could still be used, and would hold a large amount of coal. The
armory still stood as did the chimney to the smithery, the new casting shop, and new storehouse; the shears were injured near the top,
but capable of being repaired as were several pile drivers. There
were some chains still left in the yard, eight bouys for the channel,
five or six anchors, a quantity of ready made iron work, and a number of piles of 32-pound shot. The diving bells were still in good
order.
80. Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. VI, 658-59.
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which blood was shed. It was on that date that the Federals, in
a commando type raid, landed under the cover of darkness and
burned the Confederate schooner Judah. One month later the
battle of Santa Rosa Island was fought. In this engagement many
of the vices and virtues of the recently formed volunteer armies
were revealed.
The artillery duels had served only to demonstrate the
marked superiority of the Federal artillery over the Confederate,
a factor that was to be true throughout the conflict. In the Pensacola area the Federal superiority in heavy ordnance could be
attributed to several factors - trained and seasoned cannoneers,
better siege guns, and a prolific supply of powder and shells.
With its defeat at Forts Henry and Donelson the Confederate high command was forced to re-evaluate its defense commitments in the sundry departments President Davis had established.
To bolster its sagging defenses in the Tennessee River Valley
strategic outposts had to be given up - Pensacola was ordered
evacuated.
Governor Shorter, of Alabama, along with the Confederate
commanders on the spot, correctly realized that Pensacola Bay
was the best anchorage on the Gulf and urged the Confederate
War Department to hold the area. However, a bankrupt and
agrarian people lacking many of the tools of war were unable to
hold their exposed bases in the face of superior Northern sea
power. Ten days after the occupation of New Orleans by General
Butler’s troops Pensacola was yielded by the Confederates.
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